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INTRQDUCTIOH
In the following essay an attempt has been made to
examine certain aspects of those ihilosophies whose theories
of mind have contributed to the riches of philosophical
thought. The essay deals with some of the main contributions
in the study of mind. We consider the endeavours of those
philosophers who have boldly faced an incredibly complex prob-
lem and have speculated concerning the most amazing wonder of
all— the human mind and its place in nature.
Is mind something aloof from nature, endowed with a
divine capacity for forming Judgments and attaining to a
knowledge of truth, or is mind nothing more than a part of
the physical structure of things?
This question has impelled philosophers to range them-
selves into different schools of belief which can be roughly
divided into two groups. Those whose speculations take them
into the metaphysics of mind as soul, unique in a physical
cosmos, and those who see mind as a phenomenon of nature,
very wonderful but tinged with a certain melancholy, for by
mind man is not only eware of himself, but is aware of his
own fragility and of his own ultimate extinction.
Our problem is to review some of these philosophical
sources and to try to determine how (if at all) these several
divisions converge and flow into a common channel of belief.
What is the nature of mind? Some philosophers maintain that
to resolve this problem we must first ascertain what it is
that mind does and proceed in the light of this knowledge.
Others although not disparaging the activities of the mind,
believe that we are dealing with two distinct realms of being
and our task is not to attempt to determine the nature of
mind from what it does but to determine the nature of that
rapport which exists between them.
In the light of this problem our essay deals with these
several beliefs and attempts to evaluate their conclusions.
CHAPTER I
GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS
The early Greek philosopher Reraclitus was led to what
he considered to be the universal nature of the cosmic
process, that of opposition and the elimination of opposition.
The whole of life was in rrocess, wherein, ''Nothing- ever is,
1
everything is becoming'4 . Life was purely transition in
which strife played a major role.
In the world of ideas the same universal form is applic-
able, for ideas are the result of a complicated process of
elimination. One idea contends against another until the
more durable concept finds a permanent place for itself in
thought. One alternative process of reasoning eliminates
another. It is a "continual flow" or strife.
»
The problem implicit in his reasoning is basic to all
ages and to all stages of philosophical enquiry. Can we re-
solve the nature of this seeming conflict, not only in nature
as a physical phenomenon, but alBo in the realm of metaphysics?
We shall start with an attempt to understand the Platonic
theses regarding man's ability to apprehend reality and the
reliability of such apprehension.
1 John Burnet, Early C-reek Philosophy . (Edinburgh: Adam &
Charles Bl»ok, 1892), Vol. 1, p. 149.
2 A H Benn, The GreeK Philosophers , (London. Regan,
Paul', Trench & Co., 1882) , Vol. 1, T-. 171.
2THE PLATONIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Much of our knowledge of the external world is mere
opinion for It Is a passive acceptance of sense experience.
It is without thought and is deceptive. The evidence of a
tutored mind is to be seen in the ability to distinguish the
real from the imaginary. This faculty of understanding prompts
one to seek reasons for one ! e opinions. To wonder, and to try
to find out why certain things are as they are or why they
behave as they do is the beginning of philosophy. Thus man
takes his first ster in the pursuit of knowledge. He ascends
from the particular objects of sensory experience to the ap-
prehension of universal laws and relationships.
It is true that knowledge begins with sense experience,
but the senses alone cannot attain to a knowledge of truth.
The senses contemplate only Imperfect copies of reality. ".;e
are like prisoners in a cave, who, watching by firelight,
see the flickering shadows upon the wall of the cave and be-
lieve them to be real. Nor is it simply a matter of turning
around and looking upon the substance of the shadows which
they see, for their eyes would be dazzled and blinded by
their long sojourn in the gloom of the cave.
M The entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear
Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison house in the
world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will
not misapprehend me if you interpret the Journey upwards to
be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according
3to my poor belief, which at your desire, I have expressed
—
3
whether rightly or wrongly God knows"
.
It is the intellect which is able to move in a wider
range than the senses which grasps the truths which sensible
experience oannot perceive. It is intellect which is able to
discern the universal forms which lie outside of sensible
experience and gives to us a world whose construction is
intelligible. It is not an unordered flux of sense data but
is made up of ideas which are discernible in the forms,
verifiable by reason and possessing real existence.
Without this belief, knowledge is reduced to a fluctuat-
ing and indecisive experience of the senses and nothing is
stable. Plato takes this up fully with young Theaetetus.
M 3oc. Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us
but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras,
that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who
is not?
Theaet. I suppose the last.
Soc. Then it must appear so to each of them?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And 1 appears to him 4 means the same as 'he perceives
1
.
Theaet. True.
Soc. The appearing and perceiving coincide in the case
3. B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato. Vol. I, p. 776.
New York: Random House, 19*0 . (Republic, Bk. VII).
of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear,
or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives
k
them?
"
Thus Plato shows how the reliability of sense data can
be questioned, and indeed, can be reduced to a series of
contradictory -phenomena. He repudiates the claim of Protagoras
that "Man is the measure of all things" , because of the falli-
bility of the phenomena of sensations. As Plato points out,
the theory that knowledge is identical with sense perception
is merely to substitute an individual for a universal standard
5
of truth. Nor is it possible to test the veracity of sensa-
tions per se, for such phenomena cannot be tested as to their
truth or falsity. The phenomena can only be referred to the
mind and the question becomes, not, are the senses themselves
fallacious, but are the Judgements formed by the mind as to
the meaning of the sense phenomena valid.
Plato believed that the mind can not only compare one
series of sensations with another, but can compare sensations
in retrospect and belonging to past experiences. This is
possible because the sensations are referred to some stable
criterion of Judgement which is Implicit in a theory of
ideas as a theory of Being .
THE PLATONIC THEORY OF IDEAS
Plato in his theory of ideas attempts to classify true
4. Theaetetus, qp_. cit . , Vol. II, p. 153-
5. A. y. Benn, op_. cit., Vol. I, p. 206.
5knowledge and to separate it from mere opinion. Knowledge
therefore, as distinct from opinion must be knowledge of
reality itself. The fundamental principle of the metaphysical
epistemology of Plato is that there are two distinct worlds
which must be distinguished, "...that which is and has no
6
becoming; and... that which is always becoming and never is."
Here we have this dualistic conception of the world of
reason on the one hand, and the world of perceptual relation-
ships only, on the other.
It is interesting to note that Plato developed his
doctrine of ideas from the failure of Heraclitus and the
philosophers of £lea to explain Being and Becoming. Heraclitus
taught that Becoming alone could be postulated as having
existence, while Being never is. The Eleatics on the con-
trary were equally adamant that Being does exist while
Becoming never is.
Plato took the obvious step in assuming that in this
changing world, that which is unchangeable and absolute
must be real. It is the idea which is the ground of ascer-
tainable knowledge and the reality of Being.
"Which of the patterns had the Artificer in view when
he made the world—the pattern cf the unchangeable, or that
which is created? If the world be indeed fair and the
artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to
6. B. Jowett, m. cit., Vol. II, p. 12. (Timaeus)
6that which is eternal; but if what oannot be said without
blasphemy is true, then too the created pattern. Every one
will see that he must have looked to the eternal; for the
world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of
causes. And having been created in this way, the world has
been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by
reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must of necessity,
if this is admitted, be a copy of something. Mow it is all-
important that the beginning of everything should be according
to nature. And in speaking of the oopy and the original we
may assume that words are akin to the matter which they
describe; when they relate to the lasting and permanent and
Intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and,
as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable
—
nothlm? less. But when they express only the cory or likeness
and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be
likely and analogous to the real words. As being is to be-
7
coming, so is truth to belief"
.
The idea is the core of unchangeable reality which
underlies the surface qualities of perceptivity. 7>e oannot
deny an idea without denying existence itself. To say that
the ideas of goodness, justioe, being, etc., do not exist,
is to say that anything which possesses the qualities of
7. B. Jowett, 0£. clt., Vol. II, p. 13- (Timaeus)
7goodness, Justice, being, etc., does not exist and possesses
no reality.
The idea transcends the world of concrete existence.
Its abiding place is apparently in the heavenly spheres and
yet this... "colorless and formless and intangible essence is
8
visible to the mind...".
It is the property of mind to interpret for us the world
of appearances. Thus the function of mind is an exalted
function for it is the link which Joins us with the world of
reason and reality. Were the mind inadequate to apprehend,
however dimly, these eternal essences, the way of man would
be the way of all unintelligible matter.
THE SOUL
Plato is concerned above all things with the soul. It
is the soul which elevates and enobles man above all living
things. Plato's prime purpose throughout the Dialogues is
to be found in the repeated references and allusions to man's
soul. He was oonsumpd with a desire to make the soul as
living and as vital a thought to others as it so patently was
to him.
The soul is immaterial, imperishable and real. Its real
habitat is in the world of ideas and ideal forms. This has
striking verification in the doctrine of recollection which
8. B. Jowett, op. Pit ., Vol. I, p. 252. (Fhagdrus)
8in turn presupposes the doctrine of pre-existence. It is
because of the essentially divine nature of the soul that we
are enabled from time to time to catch an intuitive glimpse
of the ideal world of truth. The body, useful though it is
in this sensible existence, is nonetheless a distracting in-
fluence and likely to obscure, if one is not vigilant, the
real nature of truth.
"Is there not an absolute Justice?
Assuredly there is.
And an absolute beauty and absolute good?
Of coarse.
But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?
Certainly not.
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?
And I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness,
and health, and strength, and of the essences of true nature
of everything. Has the reality of them ever been perceived
by you through the bodily organs? .. He attains to the \urest
knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone,...
who has got rid as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so
to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion dis-
tracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her
9
from acquiring truth and knowledge"
.
9. B. Jowett, op_. clt. , Vol. I, p. 449. (Phaedo)
9It is the soul which is the centre of knowledge and it
is the soul which is oontinually striring to achieve wisdom,
to recapture its former unclouded vision. The soul is all
it is not only the animating source of life and movement of
the body—but it is a cosmic principle, an intermediary be-
tween the eternal forms and the sensible world.
The soul, uncreated and changeless is a restless sojourner
in a world of change,
SUMMARY
Flato uses the two words mind and soul, indiscriminately.
Does this imply contradiction or confusion of thought? It
is clearly not a matter of confusion so much as a denial of
any real distinction.
The soul shares the temporal experience of the body but
is not condemned as the latter is, to ultimate dissolution.
The soul has that nexus with the world of reality which is
denied to the body. Indeed, the soul is embarrassed to a very
greatextent by its physical ties. Nonetheless, the soul is
able to overcome the barriers of sense and perceives reality.
Reality is not something which is inherent in any material
structure but rather is it discerned by a capacity of the
soul to aline with every object its ideal form. The soul
confers intelligibility upon the object, not by reason of any
conscious effort, but because it is the soul's natural reaotion
so to do. It is the instantaneous recall to memory, for the
10
soul has once gazed upon the eternal forme and It recognizes
the material copies of the immaterial realities. Throughout
its earthly sojourn, the soul is constantly involved in this
process of reminiscence.
It is only logical to suppose that if pre-existence is
one pole of the soul's circle of existence then immortality
is the other. This is basic to Plato's thought and the
soul's captivity between pre-existence and the return to its
ideal realm is a form of punishment. Plato believes that the
rational part of the soul alone is immortal for it is through
dialectic that truth is reached and the veil of perceptual
experience pierced. Although it is possible for the mind to
be led astrsy by false data the innate nature of the soul is
beyond delusion. It is one with reality.
ARISTOTLE
We are led from the study of Plato to that of Aristotle
whose ideas tended to dissipate some of the obscurity which
is implicit in much of the former's thinking. Their methods
of reasoning were diametrically opposed in that the one
reasoned deductively from a priori principles while the other
went far to establish the Inductive method, whioh came to claim
so unique a place for itself in the subsequent history of
philosophies 1 speculation.
Aristotle sought to explain those principles of mental
activity by which the mind could apprehend objects, translate
11
perceptions into Intelligible form and from thence to specu-
late concerning them. His task was that of defining some
middle ground between the extremes of philosophical thought.
Protagoras, Empedocles and others were apparently emphatic
in their denial of absolute reality. There could be no
fixed standards of thought. Everything was dependent upon
perception and perception was a variable factor tfhich could
never be accepted for adducing invariable principles. Plato
on the other hand was concerned with a hypothetical world of
self-existent ideas which implied an external world of shadows
and unrealities.
SENSE PHENOMENA
Aristotle sought to find some way or some method which
would, within the scope of man's reason, be logically self
sustaining in its transition from the known to the unknown.
This meant for Aristotle a necessary belief in the reality
of sense phemomena, which Plato, as we have observed, refused
to entertain.
"Since according to common agreement there is nothing
outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial
magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms,
viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affec-
tions of sensible things. Hence, no one can learn or under-
10
stand anything in the absence of sense.."
10. Richard McKeon, editor, The Basic jorks of Aristotle,
p. 595. Oxford translation. L" <?/ York: Random
House,
1941. (De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch. 8.)
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Aristotle accepted, experience as valid and rejected
the idealist theory simply on the grounds that it was not
proved and explained nothing. By it we are afforded no knowl-
edge as to the origin of things and far from helping us to
understand existence, it robu us of what little we have and
reduces our evidences to shadows of the unknown. The relation-
ship of mind to matter must begin with the acceptance of sense
experience, faulty though our conclusions may be. We are
constrained to make use of such instruments as we have and
gain little by disparaging our primary means of contact with
reality. The mind should occupy itself in attempting to
* glean from objects as they appear, suoh information as it
can, rather than to think of them in terms of reference to
imaginary archetypes, the existence of which is one of con-
jecture.
Aristotle was concerned as to how far the dependence cf
mind upon body went. He did not hesitate to reoogni'e that
such a dependency existed and yet he sought to establish the
separate and unique place of mind. Perhaps this is where the
Platonic influence is most noticeable. Aristotle conceived
of the soul as the entelechy of the body. It is both dependent
upon and superior to, the body. Knowledge is acquired through
experience and experience is conveyed through sensation. It
is the concern of the body to derive from the Individual per-
ceived object its sensible qualities, while the mind is
concerned with the universal and intelligible form. Although
13
sensation is relegated to a subordinate position, it in no
sense loses significance, for in the absence of these sensible
qualities there is no possibility of the soul's penetrating to
the quiddity or form, which is at the core of the perceived
object.
IMAGINATION AND MEMORY
What part does imagination and memory, so much a part of
mental activity, have to play in Aristotle's theory of mind?
The answer is that their place is subordinate rather than
primary. Imagination is a kind of "inward sense" while memory
is the indistinct and lingering impression which is still re-
tained within the mind.
What then is the content of imagination? Strictly speaking
it has no real content but is an extension of the senses re-
vealed to mind in the form of Imagery.
"When the mind is actively aware of anything, it is
necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are
11
like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter"
.
Aristotle is quick to joint out that imagination is a
direct consequence of the senses and does not exist apart from
them, nor does it involve any intellectual effort.
"It is clear then that imagination cannot, be (1) opinion
plus sensation, or (2) opinion mediated by sensation, or
11. Richard McKeon, 0£. clt . , p. 595 (De Anlma, Bk. Ill,
Ch. 8.)
Ik
(3) a blend of opinion and sensation; this i , impossible both
for these reasons and because the content of the supposed
opinion cannot be different from that or the sensation:
... to
imagine is therefore identical with the thinking of exactly
12the srme as what one in the strictest sense perceives".
Does it colour our thinking? Yes of course it does, for
memory is "retained Impressions". That is to say, when we
can trace an image back to its original impression we have
memory. The more compelling some past incident is, the more
reluctant is that impression to fade. It lingers on as a sort
of guardian of our actions, easily recalled and prompting the
mind to fear, delight and so on, as it recaptures the sense
experience of past acts. It creates desire and appetite, and
anticipates the pleasant and the unpleasant.
We are, it seems, back again to our dependency upon the
senses. Our thinking cannot be wholly free from sense ex-
perience either in the present, or from our past history.
"As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name
phantasia has been formed from phaos (light) because it is not
possible to see without light. And because imaginations remain
in the organs of sense and resemble sensations
, enimals in
their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. iche
brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others
(i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in tnem of mind by
12. Ibid., p. 588. (De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch. 3.)
15
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feeling or disease or sleep"
.
INTELLECT
The distinction between the senses and that part of
the soul that thinks and knows is stressed most emphatically
toy Aristotle. The sens=s deal with a world of concrete ob-
jects but the mind has for its content the abstract and the
universal. We might ask the question, what is it (i.e. the
mind}? The answer is that mind is not an entity but a pos-
sibility or capacity.
"If thinking is like rercelving, it must be either a
process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of
being thought, or a process different from but analogous to
that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while
impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that
is, must be rotentlally identical in character with its ob-
ject. Mine! must be related to what is thinkable, as sense
is to what is sensible...
"It follows too, that like the sensitive part, it can
hsve no nature of its own other than that of having a certain
capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind is, be-
1^
fore It thinks, not actually any real thing".
In other words the senses deal with potential knowledge
!3- Ibid . , p. «?89 (De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch. 3)
Ik. Ibid., p. 590 (De Anima, Bk. Ill, Ch. k)
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while the intellect brin s it into actuality. The intellect
is naturally dependent upon the senses for its information,
but having received such information it proceeds, by a process
of unfolding, to bring into existence, out of the potential
knowledge inherent in the sense data, the idea of intelligible
form. It is this capacity for taking the potentially intel-
ligible and making it aotually intelligible which is the
crowning achievement of mind.
The intellect has a selective function and will exercise
this function commensurate with its degree of development.
Thus we can discern here the entrance of responsible choice.
Every mind performs the two processes of selection and evalua-
tion but every mind does not arrive at the same conclusion.
The test of true knowledge then must be by some method of
reasoning which will eliminate error and determine whether or
no the selective and evaluative functions have led the thinker
into truth or fallacy. It was to obviate the apparent hope-
lessness of uncertainty which impelled Aristotle to create for
our guidance the syllogistic method.
THE 3QUL
Aristotle was not able to accept Plato's world of separate
ideas and yet he conceded the reality of universal forms. The
difference however, lay in the fact that forms had no existence
apart from matter. The ideas of Flato were real and had a
completely separate and substantial existence. The logical
17
conclusion with Plato was that the idea of the self must
imply an even greater degree of reality for the human soul.
Aristotle on the other hand considered the soul as being the
form of the body and apart from the body could not be thought
to exist.
Yet both Aristotle and Plato were in accord in observing
that the world of sense was indeed a world of change and it
wae necessary to go beyond this in order to reach the basic
reality of things.
Despite his emphasis upon the sensory nature of Knowing,
Aristotle was alive to the incorporeal nature of thought and
the distinctive qualities which separated thought and matter.
He was loth however, to relinquish his conviction that
the body and the soul were inseparably bound together. If
this is true then how does it come about that thought can
transcend the limitations of space and timev The soul, he
answers, has a number of different faculties and reason is
one of them.
Reason is both a metaphysical process and an organic one.
By reason, that which is potential in meaning beoomes actually
meaningful. Eeason actualizes into consciousness the imma-
terial structure of things—or those thoughts and concepts
which make up the actuality of things.
If can discern here an Aristotelian idealism which dif-
fers only in kind from that of Plato. For he maintains that
behind all forms, all matter, is pure thought or pure actuality.
18
In this illuminative all pervading nous are the eternal
truths of things which makes up the intelligible structure of
the universe.
It is through the mind that man is able to apprehend
some of these truths. In the vast realm of thought man has
the capacity of limited discernment. Surely this alone would
give to the soul some superior position in relation to matter.
If it does, it can bring to us little satisfaction for the
mind itself is only that which is actualized. The substance
of reason is immaterial and impersonal. It floats into the
mind of man and departs from him with equal facility. The
soul is not a thinking thing in its o\m right. It is a
vehicle, an instrument, a means to an end.
SUMMARY
The mind according to Aristotle is superior to sense
knowledge but is dependent upon it. The sensations come to
us as they are, neither variable nor delusive. They impinge
upon the mind and unfold into ideas concerning them. Because
of the capacity of mind to modify perception, these ideas
can differ according to the perceiver. Imagination and memory
are extensions of the senses and differ only in so far as
imagination is sensory imagery and immediate, while memory is
the lingering impression of certain past sense experiences.
All thought is somewhat coloured by these activities.
Intellect takes potential knowledge inherent in sensations
19
and makes it actual. It hae a double function in that it
acts selectively and according to itG ran^e of development
and it makes awareness possible.
Mind to Plato was a thing in itself but mind to Aristotle
is a temporal sharing in the eternal nous. To the former,
the continued existence of personality was assured, to the
latter it is but a brief aspect of impersonal reality.
CHAPTER II
MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTIONS
AUGUSTINE
Augustine's philosophy is not always readily disengaged
from his theology and religious beliefs. Indeed, one is per-
suaded that he himself saw no reason why any real line of
demarcation should be drawn. One writer suggests that Augustine
did not possess a didactic mind and found it difficult to think
15
in terms of scientific methodology. Certainly he gave free
rein to his thinking irrespective of the conflicts incurred
in systematizing his philosophy.
KNOWLEDGE AND CERTITUDE
Augustine maintained that certainty could be attained by
the human mind. This is possible despite the fact that the
results of Adam's sinning have been the dulling of our native
powers of reason. It follows that the light of reason and
the acquiring of knowledge is revelatory. How do we know
that certitude is possible? We are led to this belief by
reason of our own assumption of the probability of truth. If
there is no truth, there can be no probability of truth, which
15. Maurice De Wulf , History of Medieval Philosophy ., London:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1935. !» pT8l7
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is palpably false. Moreover, whatever else may be called
In question, our own mental states are beyond the region of
doubt. One may doubt the veracity of a given Judgment but
one cannot doubt that one is thinking. By my doubts I prove
my existence.
His epistemology is demonstrated in this confidence in
the capacity of mind to attain true knowledge. The latter is
possible in two ways. First of all the mind derives its data
from the senses, p^id then, by reason of the divine element
within the mind, is able to discern with intelligence. The
second method is for the mind to contemplate itself in retro-
spection. For truth is indwelling within man in the form of
a divine element of understanding which goes beyond sense
perception.
M R. Does it seem to you that material things, that is
those appreciable by sense, can be wholly apprehended by the
intellect?
A. It does not.
R. What then? does it seem to you that God makes use
of the senses for the cognition of things?
A. I dare affirm nothing rashly concerning this point
but so far as I am permitted to conjecture, God in no way makes
use of senses.
R. We conclude then that consciousness is possible only
16
to the soul".
16. St. Augustine, The Soliloquies , London: Little, Brown
& Co., "1910, Bfc. II, Sec. IV, p. 61.
22
We should "bear in mind that in the philosophy of
Augustine God is postulated as fundamentally necessary to
thought. God is the source of truth and it is He who illumines
our minds, so that out of the material world of objectt, the
mind is able to comprehend.
The contemplation of one's own inner consciousness is
first to subjugate the body and then to mote from a pure
introspective knowledge of oneself to the knowledge of higher
truth. Augustine puts it as follows:
M R. What then, do you desire to know?
A. I desire to know God and the soul.
R. And nothing more?
17
A. Nothing whatever" .
It is the light of God indwelling which is our standard
of ultimate and immutable values. We rise therefore from the
contemplation of sensible objects to the inner contemplation
of our minds and hence to a certitude of knowledge through the
illumination of God.
ACTIVITIES OF THE SOUL
Augustine was not wholly uninfluenced by Plato, for whom
he had high regard, and he upholds the platonlc concept of
archetypal forms, with a difference.
"....the angel that brought God's word to Moses, being
17. Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. II, p. 10.
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asked what his name was that bade him go free the Israelites
out of Egypt, answered his name was 'I am that I am: and
thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel, I am hath sent
me to you*: as if in comparison of that which truly is, "being
Immutable the things that are mutable, are not—a truth which
18
Plato held strongly, and commended it highly"
.
God, according to Augustine, could never create irration-
ally. Everything which was created, emerged from the divine
wisdom. There must therefore, be a reason for all things,
(i.e. in the mind of God) and it is this reason which is the
essence or archetype of the object. These prototypes do not
have their locus in a separate intelligible world but only in
the wisdom of God.
It is the activities of the soul which enable man to
reach a knowledge of things. Of these activities, that of
consciousness is paramount, for it functions, according to
Augustine, by a co-operative principle between the mind, the
senses, and God.
The potentially intelligible of Aristotle can become the
actually intelligible, only through the illumination of God.
Sensation is part of the soul's activity in the body.
Through sensation comes the sensible experience of the sensible
world which is the material of consciousness. The body is a
18. St. Augustine, The City of God, London: Everyman's
Library, 19^7, Vol. I, Bk. VIII, Ch. XI, p. 235.
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vehicle for that material. It la the soul however, which
permeates the whole of man and gives to him the consciousness
of being.
To attempt to define soul is hardly possible since it
is spiritual and immaterial and like truth cannot be defined
in terms of extension. It is this same immaterial quality of
truth which Impels us to postulate its Imperishable nature.
augustine's belief is that God is the source of all knowl-
edge. The need for some standard of what la good, true and
beautiful is apparent if we are to make Judgments and determine
what is the contrary. Such a standard must be immutable and
immanent, in a word, God. The existence of God is, therefore,
the essential condition for the attainment of knowledge. To
seek knowledge is to seek God. One must first believe, in
order that one may know.
SUMMARY
Augustine makas a courageous admission of man 1 ? inability
to explain the transition from the mechanical to the illumina-
tive without bringing the presence of a third factor, God,
into his reckoning.
Certitude is possible but not from the senses alone. The
senses are faulty and are handicapped by a heritage of human
sin. Truth, however, Is part of the divine and may be intuited
by the mind, in the presence of sense experience, through the
light of understanding which is vouchsafed by God.
To Augustine the mind is the apprehending soul of man,
25
which having been created by God is functionally dependent
upon its creator. Undoubtedly the possibility of human error
led Augustine to consider the fact of self-consciousness as
the most valid metaphysical assumrtion. This war, beyond error
as it was both the evidence of self-existence and the revela-
tion of the divine creativity.
The mind to Augustine is conscious awareness and the
latter like the New Jerusnle-m i° a ift from God. One may
analyse the rrocesses of reason to some profit but the simple
•ct of "knowing" is the supreme mystery.
ST. THOMAS /&TJIKA9
The epietemology of St. Thomas is bound ttj with a revival of
Aristotelian method. He was explicit in his belief that all
knowledge begins with sense knowledge. It is from this latter
sense knowledge that we are enabled to arrive at intellectual
knowledge. Unlike the idealist rosition, he believed that we
first rerceive, not the mental process from within us, but
the Immediate experience of the external world.
MIND AND 30UL
Mind, according to Aquinas, is the highest function of
the soul. It is the capacity which enables the soul to grasp
and to unite in an intelligible way the formal structure of
objects, with the objects themselves. These forms, or ideas
of God, are inseparable from their objects but can be abstrac
by the active intellect.
The beginning of knowledge is sense perception. Sensa-
tion however, is not knowledge until it is responded to by
consciousness. It is this latter active phase which trans-
forms sensation into knowledge. Nothing is added to the sense
image but its stimulus brings to light the intelligibility
of the object. This capacity of the mind to separate, select
and form judgments is the process of understanding. The im-
pressions or forms of the objects which the mind receives are
not identical with the objects themselves but are only such
elements of thought as are necessary for the mind to know.
The ability of the mind to do this is inherent in the fact
that mind is but another faculty of the soul.
"The agent intellect .... is something in the soul. In
order to make this evident, ye must observe that above the
intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior in-
tellect, from which the soul acquires the powers of under-
19
8 tanning"
.
Not only are we to suppose that the intellect derives
its power of understanding from God but we are also led to
believe that its power to comprehend incorporeal things is
evidence of its own incorporeal nature.
Aquinas does not streps the superiority of the soul over
body to the point where one might regard the latter as a mere
19. 9t. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologi - And, Summa Contra
Gentiles , New Xork: The Modern Library, 19^8. H. 79,
A. Wt pg. 3*A.
7instrument. On the contrary, the soul is the form of the
body, and is incomplete without the bodily senses as a neces-
sary aid to intellectual knowledge.
Zf the knowledge so acquired reliable? Aquinas says
that much of it is. truth. But it is laboriously attained be-
cause man's vision of truth is only partial and is intermit-
tent. In this respect we are made cognizant of man's status
as lower than that of the divine intellect.
"The human intellect must of necessity understand by
composition and division. For since the intellect passes from
potentiality to act, it has a likeness to generable things,
which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it
by degrees. In the same way, the human intellect does not
acquire rerfect knowledge of a thing by the first apprehension;
but it first apprehends something of the thing, such as its
quiddity, which is the first and proper object of the intel-
lect; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and
various dispositions affecting the essence. Thus it necessar-
ily relates one thing with another by composition or division;
and from one composition and division it necessarily proceeds
to another, and this is 'reasoning'
.
"But the angelic and the divine intellects, like all
incorruptible beings, have their perfection at once from the
beginning. Hence the angelic and divine intellect have the
° 20
entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly..."
20. Ibid., %« 85, A. 5, P.
The intellect we observe transoends the sensible world
only as it accompanies it and is dependent upon its data. It
is this dependency which leads Aquinas to postulate some way
of obviating the seeming indignity Imposed upon a spiritually
superior power. The body, a material and perishable organ,
could not be found acceptable as dictator of the knowing and
immaterial spirituality of the mind.
It is he e then, where the innate superiority of the soul
comes into its own. God is the source of all truth and not
only does He enable us to acquire knowledge indirectly through
sensory perception but He also conveys knowledge directly .
Knowledge according to Aquinas may be either natural or re-
vealed.
The domain of faith is certainly distinct from that of
reason but it does not contradict reason. On the contrary,
it both strengthens and supplements it.
We are introduced into a realm of truth which is beyond
our powers of sensory experience to take us. Knowable truth
is enlarged by revelation which takes us beyond the llmita-
i
tions of human reason into a new kind of knowledge.
SUMMARY
The facts of consciousne fs teach us that the soul and
the body are substantially united while the nature of thought
leads us to infer the immateriality and immortality of the
soul. Soul and body are co-principles in one unit and neither
29
is complete without the other.
St. Thomas does not depart from the Aristotelian point
of view sgve when he finds himself forced to do so. The
mind is Indeed functional but it can rise above its temporal
limitations and attain to a more direct knowledge than that
afforded by the senses. It is the soul which makes man a
rational being and it is by reason of the immaterial nature
of thought that the subordinate status of the body is inferred.
Moreover, the body is destroyed with the loss of the form
which gives it being. The oonverse is not true for the form
is incorruptible. It is independent of the body in the
highest reaches of thought. Death perfects rather than de-
stroys the soul. We are now led to believe that if the soul
can rise superior to the rhysical limitations of the body,
then it can in no wise be the product of material forces.
Matter cannot produce immaterial effects. The soul therefore
was created and is the radical principle of all vital functions
(primum principium vitae.). Thus, St. Thomas grounds his
philosophy in his theology. God created the soul for the
body and the latter is vitalized by its presence. But the
soul is ever seeking perfection through knovrledge and virtue
until death separates the soul from matter.
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CHAPTER III
MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES
RENE DESCARTES
Descartes does much to establish confidence in the unique
nature of mind. His heretical method of doing this is per-
haps rather devastating to philosophical progress but cer-
tainly it arrests attention and forces one to re-examine the
validity of his beliefs. Descartes begins by discountenancing
all claims to truth other than those which are so clearly and
distinctly perceived as to be self-evident. All else, however,
must be rigorously analysed and submitted to a dialectic of
methodically reasoned enquiry.
CERTAINTY AND DOUBT
It was necessary to establish the validity of some
premise which would be beyond doubt. There must be some un-
equlvocably acceptable truth which would be the pre-supposltion
of all knowledge. The finding of such an incontrovertible
truth was fundamentally necessary as the starting place for
the acquisition of scientific knowledge.
Descartes here takes up the Augustinian argument of the
subjective certainty of the knowing self. I may doubt the
validity of the external world, it may be a dream, and I may
question the reality of objects, but I cannot doubt that the
dream is mine or that I apprehend the objects. I cannot doubt
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that I am a thinking conscious being.
.
(Cogito
,
ergo sum.).
I cannot doubt my capacity to think, though my conclusions
may be open to question.
"This alone is inseparable from me. I am—I exist; this
is certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps
it would even happen, if I should -wholly cease to think, that
I should at the same time altogether cease to be. I now ad-
mit nothing that is not necessarily true: I am therefore,
precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind,
understanding, or reason,—terms whose signification was be-
fore unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really
21
existent. . . "
.
So it is, that, from the basis of the mind's ability to
apprehend its own existence, all subsequent knowledge is
derived.
*
CARTESIAN DUALISM
Descartes proceeds to establish the antithetical nature
of mind and matter. He has intimated that the nature of mind
is that which thinks, and, by so doing has demonstrated con-
sciousness as an immaterial substance. What of the external
world of material things which we so clearly perceive? Such
a world is conveyed to our minds via sense jhenomena. Can
we doubt the evidence of these phenomena? The answer is both
21. Rene Descartes, A Discourse on Method , London: J. N.
Dent & Sons, 19^9, p. 88.
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ye« and no.
The senses record such perceptual information as colour,
sound, shape, texture and so on, and these are real qualities.
It is only when we choose to go beyond our certain knowledge
of extension that we are likely to draw false conclusions.
Whenever we depart from those certainties of extension which
have been vouohaafed to us, the responsibility is ours entirely.
That extension is real, there is no doubt, for geometry
which depend* upon extension for its data, remains the clear-
est of all sciences. The fact remains however, that we do
fall into error and this is due to our will which tends to
form Judgments from inadequate knowledge.
*.But now since we know that all our errors depend upon
our will, and as no one wishes to deceive himself, it may
• *en» wonderful that there is any error in our Judgments at all.
It is necessary to remark, however, that there is a great
difference between willing to be deceived, and willing to
yield assent to opinions in which it is found that error is
22
found"
.
Apart from this will to err, we are confronted, accord-
ing to Descartes by a distinct dichotomy of mind and matter.
There is a gulf between the essential nature of mind, which
is thoug-ht, and the essential nature of matter, whioh is ex-
tension. Mind and matter are antithetical and as created
22. ftene Descartes, oj). clt., p. 181.
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substances exist independently.
"I do not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my
nature or essence beyond ray being a thinking thing, or a
substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking,
and although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although
I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely
conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a
clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a
thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I
possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an
extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that X, that is,
my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly dis-
23
tlnct from my body, and may exist without it M .
Descartes has herein established a dualism which ever
since has vexed the minds of philosophers.
SUMMARY
Descartes believed mind to be a capacity of the soul.
It was because of a mechanical union that some measure of
accord was established between the soul and the body, that
is, between thought and extension, two antithetical substances
otherwise incompatible.
His primary search was to establish some valid form of
truth. This he believed to reside in his own intuited knowledge
23. Rene Descartes, op_. clt . , p. 132.
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of personal existence.
His belief in God as absolute perfection was founded upon
the supposition that the idea of perfect Being implied the
existence of such a Being. It is obvious that perfection is
not to be found within any finite thing and yet its concep-
tion is within us. Its cause, therefore, must lie outside
ourselves.
Descartes rests the reliability of thought upon the re-
liability of the perfect nature of God. For since the per-
fection of God involves His veracity, it is impossible that
He could so have created us as to contribute to our deception.
We can depend upon our cognitive faculties because we can
depend upon the nature of God.
Descartes however, still leaves his meaning none too
clear. How are we to bridge the gulf between the two worlds,
corporeal and incorporeal?
DAVID HUME
Descartes created a problem which subsequent philosophers
have endeavored to resolve. The materialists have reduced
mind to matter while the idealists have made matter into mind.
Hume's approach to the Cartesian dualism was unequivocal. He
maintained that it could not be rationally Justified.
Hume adopted the attitude that apart from the contents of
mind we could assume nothing. If I perceive some individual
concrete object, then I apprehend its reality through sensation
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and apart from this sensation (or series of sensations) I
have no other grounds for belief in the objectivity of the
thing in question. If it were possible for one to take in-
ventory of the mind's oontents we should probably find that
the result of such analysis would disclose the presence of
sundry perceptions, the aggregate of which produces a con-
tinuum of consciousness.
"The only existences, of which we are certain, are per-
ceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness,
command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of
2k
all our conclusions"
.
How do we obtain these perceptions and how much reality
do they possess. Hume seems to assume objective reality even
though he tends to confuse one by the subjective nature of
his deductions.
THE NATURE OF PERCEPTIONS
The mind is a locus of impressions and ideas and these
are to Hume the constituents of consciousness. Apparently
our impressions vary a good deal in intensity and relevance.
Those which most effectively influence us are significant for
their greater degree of liveliness.
"...we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into
two classes or species, which are distinguished by their
2k. David Hume, Ari Enquiry Conc erning Human Understanding .and^
Treatise of Human Nature
,
Chicago: Open Court Publishing
Co., 1912, p. 236\
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different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible
and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. The
other.
. .Impressions . By the term Impression, then. I mean
25
all our more lively perceptions."
What is herein meant by thinking?
The capacity to think Is seemingly the ability to recall
and re-arrange in a selective pattern, earlier ideas and to
do this at will. Hume describes the mind as,
"a kind of theatre, where several perceptions
successively nrnke their appearance; pass, repass, glide away,
26
and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations".
27
..."a heap or collection of different perceptions".
The substantiality of the mind can no longer be affirmed
for every faculty of the mind which has occasioned man to
compliment himself is razed to the ground. All his knowledge
and beliefs are fundamentally reducible to perceptions and
the simple structure of their relationships. Han cannot ex-
ceed the bounds of his own nature, even his most imaginative
and abstract efforts are thus simply defined.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND 9ELF-C0N3C IOUSNE33
..."when I enter most intimately into what I call myself ,
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
25. David Hume, 0£. clt . , p. 15-
26. Ibid . , p. 247.
27. Ebld . , r. 2^7.
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I can never catch myaelf at any time without a perception,
and never can observe anything but the perception.
.. .If any
one upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has
a different notion of himself
. ...All I can allow him is,
that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are
28
essentially different in this particular.
..
w
The whole process of Ideation is one of successive images, or
perceptions. Consciousness is never consciousness of self
but of related perceptions and even the belief in coherent
relationship cannot be justified.
Hume saw no valid reason for supposing a necessary re-
lationship of causation, without which we could not have
coherence, save on the basis of experience alone. Yet ger-
mane to all Intelligent thought is the property of coherence.
The reason for this, according to Hume, is because of a
•flowing' process, in which any series of perceptions, are
related to each other by resemblance and oontiguity. It is
this stream of resemblances which creates the illusion of
constancy and coherence making for consciousness.
The inner world of the 1 self * oan tell us nothing of it-
self for as an entity it does not exist.
What then can be said of objective reality? Very little,
for its substantial nsture is lost in its reduction to per-
ceptions and the continued existence of any object is prob-
lematic. Vrtiat we actually hsve is a stream of rapid perceptions
28. David Hume, op . clt
. , p. 246.
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which, though not Identical, bear such close resemblance to
each other as to create the illusion of both fixed existence
and coherent connection. This pan-phenomenalism allows us
little within the context of consciousness save our percep-
tions and these are suspect.
SUMMARY
David Hume has reasoned that the nature of mind is merely
its contents, that is, it is impernanent and dependent upon
sense phenomena. The process of Ideation is but a suooession
of different perceptions related and cemented together by
their resemblances to each other. The mind or consciousness
is the sum of its Impressions and is so conditioned to expect
a "cause and effect" procedure that the necessity of such an
order is th* basic structure of thought. It is this same
inner necessity which Impels us to confer upon the external
world oonstant identity within the framework of an ordered
pattern.
Hume has reduced mind to its contents and has then analysed
its oontents. The mind is able to view the world as it does
because of a fixed mode of behavior. It has certain presupposi-
tions of beliefs which govern all mental prooesses. Externality
is one such belief and necessary connection is another. Upon
>
these hinge the nature of thought.
Just as philosophers have accepted the principle that we
can h ve no idea of external substance, distinct from the
ideas of particular qualities, so also in regard to mind, we
can have no notion of it, distinct from particular perceptions.
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HENRI BERGSON
Henri Bergson, whose treatment of the Heraclitean dictum
"everything changes", has done much to stimulate contemporary
philosophy, begins by denying the ability of mechanistic
philosophy to define mind adequately. The proponents of such
philosophy have failed to prove that the psychical is deter-
mined by the physical. True they have described how, but they
have not been able to prove how, nor have their explanations
been entirely satisfactory.
David Hume himself, whose efforts were at least as thorough
as most, expressed himself as far from satisfied with his
29
explanations.
Bergson was emphatic in his belief that consciousness
and the physical functions of the brain were not identical.
Undoubtedly there is a distinct relationship , but Just what
the nature of this relationship is, has not yet been established.
An analysis of consciousness indicates that the conception
of mind as a stream of conscious states is no longer tenable.
These states of consciousness are themselve- continually
undergoing change, and our conception of constancy must be
reoonsidered. We are in a never ceasing process of change.
We are indeed, change itself. Herein then is a condition
wherein we cannot say that anything changes because outside of
change there is no category of description.
Nonetheless, we do discern by the intellect a seemingly
static and dependable world. This is both the evidence of
our senses and the basis of our intellectual concepts. Reality
29. David Hume, op_. cit
. ,
pp. 260-263.
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is represented, to us as a oonstant. It is obvious then, that
something ll wrong somewhere, for we are being presented with
a world of constancy which actually does not exist as such.
UTILITARIAN NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
We gain our knowledge of things through experience and
we accept as real only the evidence of experience. The mind
Is a storehouse of such experiences and its function is to
feed into consciousness those values of past experience which
can usefully serve the present situation.
"Thus is ensured the appropriate reaction, the correspond-
ence to environment—adaptation, in a word—which is the
general aim of life. And a living being which did nothing
but live would need no more than this. But, simultaneously
with this process of perception and adaptation which ends in
the record of the past in the form of motor habits, conscious-
ness, as we have seen, retains the image of the situations
through which it has successively travelled, and lays them
side by side in the order in which they took place. Of what
us* are these memory-images? Preserved in the memory, re-
produced in consciousness, do they not distort the practical
character of life, They would, no doubt, if our actual
consciousness. . . .did not set aside all those among the vast
images which cannot be co-ordinated with the present per-
30
ception and are unable to form with it a useful combination".
Thus apparently is man able to survive and make progress
in a highly developed behavior pattern. It is this combination
30. Henry Bergson, Matter and Memory , London: George Allen
A Unwin, Ltd., 1911, p. 96.
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of memory and experience which is the consciousness of man.
It is a vital part of the adaptation of the species to
environment. What of our ideas? These too can be similarly
accounted for. Ideas arise when memory and perception commingle
and emerge as a constructively useful form of concept. The
purpose of whioh is practically motivated.
INTELLECT AND INTUITION
The purpose of intelleotion is one which has its roots
in the soil of useful necessity and it is shaped by the
categories in which it works,
"...intelligence is the faculty of constructing unorgan-
ized—that is to say artificial—instruments
. If, on its
account, nature gives up endowing the living being with the
instruments that may serve him, it is in order that the
living being may be able to vary his construction according
31
to circumstance..".
Intellection is a faculty whose primary purpose is that
of achieving enos and these ends are the satisfactions of
the organism.
It is at best a faulty instrument. Does it not present
to us a world of static and dependable qualities when the
truth is that the universe is a continuous flow?
However necessary it may be for us to live In a stable
world, we cannot allow the utilitarian tendency of intellect
to obnoure the true nature of reality.
Behind the eternal and continuing change of things is a
31. Henry Bergson, Creative Evolution
, London: Macmillan
A Co., 1919, p.TSFI
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powerful upward surge-elan vltal~a creative and vital force,
in whioh we share and of which we are a part. This dynamic
urge Is inherently a part of the whole universal structure.
We see it in the constant change of nature—the emergence of
new forms and the bewildering diversity of :ife.
Whvt does this notion of Bergson imply? It carries with
it a teleological significance and the implication of mind
in a major context. Although he detracts from the human mind
any real value as an entity, he infers from the ebulliency of
nature an idealistic and purposive vitality. The role of the
human mind is to Bergson a minor one in the great drama. It
is but an Incident in the workings of the creative urge.
It Is by intuition alone that we transcend our own
natures. What then does he mean by intuition? It is the
direct and immediate apprehension of knowledge, which the
intellect, of itself, cannot achieve. It is through intuition,
which has a divining sympathy with reality, that we are able
to penetrate to the essence of things. Bergson believes that
intuition completes, rather than overthrows, intellect. It
is by intuition that we are able to discern this vital im-
pulse which permits nothing to be, save that which is change.
SUMMARY
Bergson defines mind as that which is useful to the
organism in the constant challenge of environment. In this
world of chan e it is the function of mind to give to the
organism a sense of dependability, to fuse the endless change
of things into an apparently stable form. Mind is a means
*3
to an end and the end is the life of the organism.
Can this be the whole story of mind, a purely physical
function and a fallacious witness as to the true nature of
things? Bergson, however, having shown the limitations of
mind, resorts to intuition. But is not intuition a function
of the mind? True it may be regarded as an involuntary
activity but if Bergson is right then intuition Is the highest
function of the mind and superior to conceptual ability. Is
true mind that which serves the organism or that which brings
us into touch with reality?
It is not the intellect whioh enables us to reach the
heart of experience for the latter is falsified by the in-
tellect. We intuit the reality of experience from within
and not from without. True mind is not that which serves
the organism in its efforts to survive but that which inter-
prets the true meaning of the efforts involved.
CHAPTER IV
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
REALISM
"Realism holds that things known may continue to exist
unaltered when they are not known, or that things may pass in
and out of the cognitive relation without rrejudice to their
reality, or that the exist nee of a thing is not correlated
with or dependent upon the fact that anybody experiences it,
32perceives it, conceives it, or is in any way aware of it".
Hence realism confines much of its study to the establish-
ing of the reality of externality. It ascribes reality to
more than the tangible, concrete evidences of our senses, but
goes further and ascribes reality also to values of Judgment,
the universal forms of our thinking becoming "subsistent
entities"
.
Can realism help us in our study of mind Itself? We may
establish to our satisfaction the reality of the objective
world around us, but what of the mind by which it is appre-
hended?
In realism we face a doctrine of pluralism which not
only separates mind from matter fairly conclusively but which
32. Edwin B. Holt, et al., The New Realism ; Co -operative
Studies in Philosophy , Mew York: The Macmillan Co.,
1912, p. 300 (W. P. Montague.)
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also separates universale, physical laws, mathematical con-
stants and moral values. All are individual levels of "being,
for the objective world is real, the conscious apprehending
mind is real and the experience itself wherein the conscious
mind and the objective world interact is real also.
According to Bertrand Russell, reality is one in essence
but pluralistic in manifestation. The world of reality is
made up of neutral stuff which is arranged in differing com-
binations of reality. In one form it is matter, in another
it is mind.
Modern science has proved rather conclusively that matter
is not a stable element at all and psychology has also demon-
strated that mind does not have the substantial quality which
was once assumed for it. Matter and mind are merely derivatives
from some oommon source stuff, or as Russell calls it "relative
particulars"
.
It is the apparent fluidity of these particulars which
not only creates objective reality but is responsible also for
mental states.
"Physics and psychology are not distinguished by their
material. Mind and matter are logical constructions; the
particulars out of which are constructed, or from which they
are inferred, have various relations, some of which are studied
33
by physics, others by psychology" .
33. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, London: George
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951, 307.
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We are left with a definition of mind which robs it of
any peculiar distinction, save in a purely functional sense-
certainly not in regard to status or quality. The mind can
lay no claim to superior status in the universe. It is but
an aspect of the constant flux of reality at work within
"logically ordered systems". The conscious mind exercises
a function which is neither transcendental nor supernatural
for it has its place within the economy of nature like any
other function. It is a presumptuous suggestion that con-
sciousness is confined exclusively to the human mind. Con-
sciousness pervades nature in a much wider sense than is
commonly understood. It is a matter of definition. It is
moreover, the task of the naturalist or the empiricist to
explore this consciousness and to determine the conditions
under which it works.
It seems that although most realists are prepared to
recognize the human mind as an aspect of reality, they do
little to enhance its prestige. The realist says, in a word,
that human awareness is a mode of consciousness, nothing is
determined by mind, for mind is only part of the scheme of
things—or in case scheme implies a sch-mer, and to those who
object to such an implication—the order of things. Yet
mind does appear to be extant in the universe and is an in-
credibly wondrous thing. Its place and purpose in the universe
is surely moet inadequately explained by a doctrine, which,
while admitting its reality, denies its pre-eminence.
hi
Even if the laws of mind are as fixed and determined as
are the lews of growth which govern the growth of a cabbage,
the fqct remains that the mind knows that it exists, and it
knows that the cabbage exists. It is hardly likely that the
reverse is true.
However, not all realists are committed to determinism
nor inde°d are they all in sympathy with the neo-realism of
Bertrend Russell.
The realist knows that he is real and one must suppose
that he is prepared to accent the reality of other minds also.
This supposition alone opens up an interesting field of en-
quiry. Where there is a multitude of minds there must
certainly be as many aspects of reality. Each mind differ
a
and agrees in many particulars with all the other minds. It
is not too difficult to appreciate the divergencies of thought.
The«e can be readily understood on purely arbitrary grounds.
But what of the measure of agreement, how did it arise?
"we are here close to an understanding of the realism of
Plato in his world of ideas. For it is a necessary postulate
of thought to in^er an even greater reality beyond, if only
to account for those agreements which allow many minds to
converge along a common highway.
The dominant disagreement among the ranks of the realists
who are opposed to this view is probably due to an over
confident belief in natural laws. The world is to them a
material system det-rmined by rhysical laws and mind is not
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above but within the range of these laws. whatever of
seeming superiority mind claims for itself, at best it can
only be taken for granted. However plausible this may be,
one should not overlook the fact that the absolute rejection
of all possible reality outside the limits of finltude is
indefensible. It is an example of dogmatism which is equally
guilty of trespassing beyond the boundaries of human knowledge.
It is not possible to arrive at a conception of mind
which would remain true for all realists. There is no united
front on this matter. To the skeptical realist, mind is a
phenomenon which needs no special reference. To the theistic
realist, mind in an evidence of a more complete reality beyond
our knowledge. To both skeptic and theist there is one bond
of unity—mind is real.
The realist recognizes values, laws, moral and ethical
compulsions, as realities-— the skeletal structure of human
life and conduct, but the cognition of such does not confer
ujon the knower any perpetuating quality. We have a record
of what the mind does end have no reason to suppose that what
it i_s, is of any more significance than that of any other
phenomenon of nature
.
To the realist mind is a process, that it is any more
than this, hes not yet been established.
2^9
INSTRUMEWTALI3M
John Dewey Is perhaps the most vigorous proponent of
Instrumentallsm and sets forth the tenets of that philosophi-
cal approach most suitably for our purpose.
The human mind possesses for John Dewey no unique
significance. It is a highly organized and acutely developed
organ whose chief purpose is to link up experiences in specific
ways. The mind has the task of instrumentally connecting one
experience to another and creating a coherence out of a series
of experiences.
The mind then, is a responsive agent whose function is
only valid as long as it deals with specific events. The
evolutionary ascent of man has demonstrated the paramount
necessity for adaptation, or responsiveness to environment.
In this way the more organized brain of the higher animals
has enabled the survival of the fittest to become the law
of nature.
The fittest does not imply the most worthy to live in
a moral sense, but the most capable of adaptation and of re-
sponsive behavior to fear, danger, and changed situations.
All this demanded not reflective powers but responsive powers.
Specifio situations calling up specific reactions.
Thus, according to Dewey, the true and primary function
of mind is not reflection, which can conjure false situations
and lead to false Judgments, but it is an instrument of re-
lationship, moving from one experience to another.
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The inner life is primarily concerned with the imjulse
or desire of the organism and only secondarily with thought
or reason. The basic purpose of thought is that it might
further the organism in its attempt to realize its desires.
The Impulse provides the motive power when desire is centered
around an object and gives rise to action in a particular way.
The essence of such a doctrine it found in the words
commonly associated with Instrumentallsm, "To know, is to know
how to do"
.
The mind has been reduced to a biological phenomenon
whose duties are prosaic and mundane. We will examine this
more fully in the light of Dewey's further considerations.
A DEFINITION OF MIND
According to Dewey, philosophers have made the grave
mistake of creating a false dichotomy of mind and body. Yet,
there is no real separation possible for mind is a natural
outcome of a highly developed physical organism, an organism
which has evolved over an incredibly long period of time,
amidst a variety of environmental challenges. It is disastrous
to thought to try to separate the various activities of body
and mind. It creates a problem which inhibits any possibility
of attaining a true picture of things. Mind and body should
not be divorced from each other for they are one, and as one,
express themselves in action.
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"xhen we take the standpoint of action we may a till treat
some functions as primarily physical and others as primarily
mental. Thus we think of, say, digestion, reproduction and
locomotion as conspicuously physical, while thinking, desiring,
hoping, loving, fearing are distinctively mental. Yet if we
are wise we shall not regard the difference as other than one
of degree and emphasis. If we go beyond this point and draw
a sharp line between them, consigning one set to body exclusively
and the other to mind exclusively we are at once confronted by
undeniable facts. The being who eats and digests is also the
one who at the same time is sorrowing and rejoicing; and it
is a commonplace that he eats and digests in one way to one
effect when glad, and in another when he is sad. Eating is
also a social act and the emotional temper of the festal board
enters Into the alleged merely physical function of digestion
What the facts testify to is not en influence exercised
across and between two separate things, but to behaviour so
Integrated that it is artificial to split it up into two
things 0 .
Thus Dewey asserts that body and mind are not two distinct
entities seeking to influence each other, but two integrated
rarts of one whole, united in the common function of living.
It is true that our knowledge of psychological processes has
3^. Joseph Ratner, editor, The Philosophy of John Dewe£,
New York: Henry Holt &~"<To. , 1928, p. 73.
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demonstrated that the body is not wholly free from mental
states nor mental states from bodily conditions. Mind is a
psycho-physical phenomenon, not to be despised because of it,
but to be appreciated as such. All our attempts to separate
mind and body are misguided and spring from our unhappy dis-
position to see things as separate parts and functions instead
of as operative wholes. It is the amazing fitness of many
parts and functions into intricate wholes which is the puzzle
and delight of nature. Each part fits Into the life of its
neighbour and each is dependent and Instrumental in the life
of the other. The whole is a process and the function of each
object, animate or Inanimate, is its part within that process.
The body-mind relationship is an example of this interlocking
order of nature.
"The world seems mad in pre-occupatlon with what is
specific, particular, disconnected in medicine, politics,
science, industry, education. In terms of a conscious control
of inclusive wholes, search for those links which occupy key
positions and which effect critical connections is indis-
pensable. But recovery of sanity depends upon seeing and using
these specifiable things as links functionally significant in
a process. To see the organism in nature, the nervous system
in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex
in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt
philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be _in,
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not as marbles are In a box but as events are in history,
35in a moving, growing, never finished process".
CONSCIOUSNESS
Can we attain to some definition of consciousness which
will enable us to see mind as something more than an adjunct
to physioal life? Dewey seems to imply that we can. Conscious-
ness as differentiated from the totality of mental experiences
which we call mind, is the locus of attention in any given
moment.
"Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are
embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a
being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings,
it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contem-
porary or future, JLn their meanings, the having of actual
ideas. The greater part of mind is only implicit in any
conscious act or state; the field of mind—of operative
meanings—is enormously wider than that of consciousness.
Mind Is contextual and persistent; consciousness is
focal and transitive. .. .Mind is a constant luminosity;
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consciousness intermittent 1'.
We observe that consciousness is not mind as such, save
in a limited and focal sense. For mind is discursive and
35. Joseph Ratner, oj). pit. , p. 81.
36. Ibid., i. 303.
5^
has for its content the wide hidden backgrounds of once
conscious states. Consciousness however, is like a spot-light
which illumines where it falls ana" leaves its surrounds, not
entirely erased, but submerged in the shadows.
But what of this illumination? It is the easiest thing
in the itforld to describe the fact of awareness without explain-
ing 3 thing. Dewey i3 aware of this anomaly and he seeks to
find something to say about it which will help to elucidate his
problem. He asserts that the nervous system has been tracked
down to the cortex of the brain but eo far it has not been
possible to say which part of the cortex is the seat of con-
sciousness. But, he vTarns, we should beware lest we forget
to think in terms of whole results rather than in specific
parts. The problem he avers is no problem at all when viewed
in this overall perspective. It is like trying to explain a
piece from a Jig-saw puzzle, which, when seen as a whole,
needs no such explanation.
One oannot help but feel th=it the problem is still very
much with ua. It has been frequently said by Instrumentalists
that consciousness has been exaggerated out of all proportion
to its real place and significance in the life of the organism.
There is enough truth in this for it to warrant consideration.
Undoubtedly we tend to overlook the fact that life is
lived, not in the fleeting momentarlness of consciousness, but
as a result of the many psycho-physical processes which are
going on all the time and of which we are not conscious. We
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have only to think of growth, digestion, breathing, and the
many involuntary acts of the body to realize the extremely
complex nature of life, a very small part of which enters into
consciousness. The instrumentalist is here faced with an
unavoidable dilemma. If the conscious mind has evolved in
such a way as to facilitate the aims of the organism, what of
the hidden processes of life which account for so much and
yet are without conscious motive?
We have a very strong case for unconscious motivation as
a power which is apparently responsible to a large extent for
what we are and even for our survival.
It is perfectly patent that this unconscious motivation
has ends after which it strives and it Is equally plain that
it achieves these ends with amazing success.
We need but to widen our concept a little to se- quite
readily the working of such an unconscious motivation behind
the whole order of nature. Even our conscious awareness is
accompanied by the unconscious and lightning play of many
physiological functions.
The instrumentalist does not convince when he asserts
that mind is only a means of facilitating ends. He Implies
that the end of the organism needs to be known. In most oases
the ends are not known, they are simply achieved. If nature
can get along very well without consciousness and obviously
does so, then out of what necessity did consciousness emerge
and what are the specific ends which demand that the object
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sought shall be known?
Mind as a means to an and is not herein repudiated as
an unworthy purpose but rather does it indicate that our
sights should be raised to cover those ends which lie outside
the range of the unconscious. The unconscious mind, which
governs most of our living has for its purpose the survival
of the organism and the satisfaction of its desires, but the
conscious mind has a far higher purpose to achieve. It la a
purpose which will make for the moral and spiritual maturity
of man, and this is the essential property of consciousness.
IDEALISM
Idealism has its emphasis upon the absolute nature of
mind and in some Instances has gone so far as to reject the
reality of all existence apart from the knower. This is not
entirely true of the objective form of idealism which does
at least posit the existence of objects outside of the human
mind—existent in the mind of God.
Consciousness, according to the Idealist, is the most
important problem which the philosopher has to encounter.
It is fundamental to an understanding of both the knower and
the known. The problem is a unique one in that consciousness
Is both subject and objeot at the same time.
It is this capacity however, to indulge in such a re-
markable feat, according to Josiah Royce, which leads us to
believe that the infinite must be a person. He assuredly cannot
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be less than we ourselves.
Through the finite we are able to discern him imperfectly
and our difficulty becomes acute when we try to describe him
in terms of personality—terms which are essentially human,
"What is a person?", is not easily answered, for although
we may feel very sure of our knowledge in this respect it is
not easy to define adequately. We Invariably begin by en-
larging those virtues and those values which we ourselves
possess in a more limited degree and positing their absolutes
in the person of God.
Hence we arrive at a super-personality, measurable and
partially understood to our finite minds.
"In seeking after God, there are many who do indeed begin
by asking the question, "Who am I?* but who thence proceed by
offering some facile answer, such as the well-known one, "I
am a thinking substance/ or the still more familiar one, "I
am a being possessed of free choice and volition," and on
such a basis a theology is quickly built up. This theology
will therefore, indeed, take a comparatively naive shape. I
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am a person. God, of course, is another".
We are thus oompelled to go beyond the definitive powers
of our own naivete. He, that is the idealist, aware only of
his own fragment of self-consciousness declines to state a
priori his ideas of personality in philosophical terms.
37. Josiah noyce, Studies of Good and gvil , New York:
Appleton * Co., 1898, p. 1^3
.
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How then do wt attain to knowledge? Must we not begin
by recognising the fragmentary nature of consciousness as we
experience it, and draw from our own hopes and longings the
inference that such a consciousness is incomplete in itself?
It is obvious then that the world of persons is made up
of such scraps of consciousness, all falling short of complete-
ness. Mind is not the complete fully conscious entity we
supr-ose it to be. On the contrary, it is only partially aware
of its world in that its experience is partial. The human
mind demands some wider concept within which it will find its
place, for only within such a concept can we ascribe to it
adequate meaning.
It in the belief of the idealist that we are Inevitably
led to postulate • 'Consciousness 1 which is the sum of the
fragments. His aim is to achieve completeness and to account
at the same time for the obviously incomplete nature of human
experience. This completeness cannot lie within objects in
isolation but can only be found within the whole olosely
interwoven structure of the world.
The known demands a knower and we can only postulate
existence for those things which enter into consciousness. This
does not invalidate the supposition that there may be many
things which are not known and which do not depend for their
existence upon being known. This is not a point of issue to
an idealist, who has denied nothing except such denials as
may be implicit in the statement that human experience is
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incomplete and limited.
The principle of completeness eo necessary to the idealist
provides an eccount of the world which can be said to be ade-
quate in so far as it embraces all those beliefs which have
been established as true beyond all reasonable doubt. It
follows thst the world cannot contain contradictions and the
meln function of reason if to reconcile apparent contradictions.
Nor is there room for a belief in I separate world of material
things which is the peculiar field of science.
The idealist is aiming at a monistic conception of the
world which will bold together uncler rigid examination. It
is not an ides which can be attacked by science because it
finds room within it for the verified conclusions of science.
It coeB refute the assumptions of materialism and rejects the
impersonal nature of mechanical law, for the idealist maintains
above al3 that thought precedes matter and is not merely an
episode in the history of matter. Behind material existence
there must be thought as the prir.al necessity.
One can readily understand Royce's objection to the
usually facile description of personality as hopelessly inade-
quate to describe the nature of the universal mind. For the
ultimate consciousness is a structure of thought Inaccessible
to our complete understanding.
What value does Idealism give to the human mind? Obviously
only a limited value and yet it does- not disparage it. The
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real value of our minds is their contributions to the harmony
of the whole, in clarifying true knowledge, and in establishing
those elements of truth which admit of no contradiction and
which will lead us into a fuller understanding of absolute
experience.
Mind to the idealist is too big a concept for the human
mind to fulfill adequately. Each human individual mind is
part of a larger all-inclusive mind. It would be presumptuous
to describe this latter in terms of some super-personality,
for a fragment of anything is incapable of describing its
whole, or of having any idea as to the real nature of the
whole.
Unity is a basic law of the universe. We see this born
out in every field of learning and ere led to believe that
some larger unity, some overall harmony, in which our
incomplete minds shall find their completeness, is a neoessary
conclusion.
How this is brought about is a matter of opinion. For
Idealists differ radically among themselves. It is clear
that if your idealism finds its roots in a theistic, self-
conscious conception of Mind, then completeness will be
achieved in a very different manner than would be the case if
your inclinations took you to conceive of an impersonal,
non-conscious World-Mind.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
THE PROBLEM STATED
Among the divergent philosophies which have been con-
sidered there are certain distinctive trends which are marked
by an emphasis upon either the functional or the metaphysical
concepts of mind. It would he untrue to say that these
philosophical systems were clear cut and definitive. There
is a wide range of agreement among them and an equally wide
range of disagreement.
Speculation regarding the nature of mind is considered
in several ways (a) that intellect is the highest manifesta-
tion of mind, (b) that the phenomenon of consciousness 16 all
we can legitimately call mind, and (c) that the soul possesses
all these faculties as diverse expressions of a single entity.
Even withinthese several categories there is no complete
agreement as to the exact connotations of Intellect, con-
sciousness and soul. There are however, certain broad principles
which are generally accepted and referred to as common sense.
It is upon this latter element that we shall venture to review
these three categories of mind.
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THE MIND A3 INTELLECT
I33UE3 INVOLVED
*fe may begin by defining intellect as that cognitive
faculty of mind which is capable of conceptual thought. If
intellect, however, reveals all that is unique in mind we
still have not established the nature of thought. Can we say
that mind is what it does without finding ourselves confronted
by the dilemma, •Just how does it do anything 1 ?
If intellect is a purely organic phenomenon then how
are we to account for the immaterial nature of ideas? The great
problem is the perennial one of trying to ^certain the nature
of the transition of object to subject so that it becomes
knowledge. Fhysiology cannot explain apprehension and it would
seem that this is the stumbling block, over which, those who
elevate intellect as the chief quality of mind, needs must
find a way.
SOLUTIONS OFFERED
The solutions offered are either metaphysical as in the
case of Aristotle or instrumental as in the case of John Dewey.
I. Aristotle was convinced of the immaterial nature of
thought and Intellection. He saw intellect as a process at
work actualizing the potential intelligibility of matter. By
his postulating of universal forms he was able to bring into
close relationship both the metaphysical and the physical
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aspects of mind and thus resolve this dilemma. An object
became actualized when it became intelligible. Just exactly
what these forms were per se Aristotle could not say. They
were a convenient postulate.
2. John Dewey refused to be dismayed by any apparent
dualism. He simply dismissed such a contention as founded
upon a wrong approach to the subject. Mind was a product of
evolution and as a part of a complex nervous structure
functioned in a particular way. Intellect was a means of
facilitating ends and had evolved out of necessity.
GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Undoubtedly one of the most successful approaches to the
study of mind is that which stresses ratiocination as pre-
eminently the substance of mind. The ability to conceive of
ideas, to co-ordinate and assemble these ideas is surely of
all mental phenomena most singular and unique. Will and
feeling may perchance be found among the lower creatures in
rudimentary form but man alone forms judgments, and man only
is able to utilize his past experiences, associate his Ideas
and confront any present situation fortified by his ability
to think 'through' his problems.
Plato as well as Aristotle were profoundly moved by this
function of mind but were not persuaded to state that mind is
this and nothing else. They were all too cognizant of the
fact that mind oould not be adequately described in terms of
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Intellect. Undoubtedly the intellect la a unique and majeatlc
Instrument. It Is more than reminiscence and it is far more
than a passive cognition of sense data. The Intellect is a
creative and forceful reality by means of which the phenomena
of the sensible world are woven into the fabric of human
existence. It is an amazing ability by means of which the
self and the other are brought Into coherent relationship.
It is by the Intellect that we are able to evaluate, to
weigh the pros and oons of any situation and to make Judg-
ments. The veracity of the Judgments made is inconsequential
for the feet remains that the Judgments are the outcome of
reflective thinking. We are able to draw inferences from
what has already happened regarding what will probably happen
In the future. It has been argued by Dewey that these are
little more than the habits of experience rather than reflec-
tion. This is probably true in a limited degree but the fact
Is that we are not entirely the slaves of experience and the
element of free choice is indicative of some reflective powers.
However scornfully the behaviorlnt may reject this suggestion
one is persuaded that intellect does possess certain freedoms.
No previous conditioning could explain my departure into
thoughts of abstract Justice or into thoughts of the infinite
or Into the voluntarily relinquishing of my own good for some
ideal end. It is intellect alone which enables me to weigh one
set of Ideals against another and to argue in behalf of my
choice.
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Why then should there he any feeling of inadequacy when
we describe the mind as simply Intellect? It is because there
is an indefinable disquiet which permeates all our thought
end forces upon us the feeling that we are not to be so
analysed in such simple terms. We are composite creatures and
the Intellect is a part of the whole. The primacy of the
intellect in the existence of the individual is without ques-
tion. It is a means of his knowing and thinking and questioning.
Mind however, is more than what it does. Thought is basically
a metaphysical Phenomenon as Aristotle discerned and which
Descartes saw as the fundamental problem of philosophy. The
fact is, that we move among the physical objects within ex-
perience in an intelligible way, only because of a metaphysical
nexus. However strenuously this may be repudiated the fact
seems plain that thought is of a non-physical nature.
It would appear then that those philosophers who reject
the intellect as a means of attaining true knowledge are
trying to bring thought into a rational framework wherein the
only truth is that which is immediate and expedient. The first
step taken paradoxically enough, is to disparage the trust-
worthiness of mental experiences. We use a discredited medium
for the purpose of proving something which shall be accepted
as true.
The thorough going skepticism of David Hume is undoubtedly
a salutary thing in that it affords a disciplinary cheok upon
any tendency towards deifying the intellect. Epiphenomenalism
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is howevar, a sterile philosophy and leaves one with the
reeling that not only la It altogether too facile but It
destroys too much. Deification of the intellect it one thing
to be avoided but a cynical lconoolaam le not the an aver.
Despite the several ways of approaching the problem, all
the philosophers whom we have considered seem to converge
arOttfldi one 7>oint, that the mind deals In intangible—conoepts
and Ideas—has recourse to memory and phantasy, and Indulges
In a distinct mental life. Our difficulty arises the moment
we begin to npeoul ite as to the nature of this distinctiveness
.
We find ourselves oonfronted by at least two main sohools
of thought. Either life an we know it is dualistic or It la
somehow one. Bertrand Russell in his theory of knowledge
prefers to think of matter and mind as two aspeota of one sub-
etanoe In continual flux. It in however, no whit easier to
think of one aspect of matter apprehending what it itself was
or is to be. It is a peculiar weakness of most of us to feel
that if we own reduce mind to matter then we have neareu a
solution to our problem. Nonetheless Dewey fails to carry
oonvlction with his purely functional definition of mind,
which is merely exchanging old dogmas for new. It is precisely
here where idealism takes over and, as it were, turns the
hour-glass upside down again. We arrive where we b<*gan ae far
as our problem is concerned.
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THE MIND A3 CONSCIOUSNESS
ISSUES INVOLVED
Ib consciousness a thing in itself? Ia it possible to
determine the value of consciousness as thft wrlch is dominant
among- the various activities of mind? Indee<i can Intellect
be other than consciousness in particular foci? Self-conscious-
ness is denied by Hume, whose contention it is that we are
never aware of anything other than perceptions. The self is
a pure illusion. If this Is true why is the idea of the
self so deeply implanted as to make its denial a matter of
incredulity?
Consciousness is not, of course, confined to self-
consciousness. It can have a strictly impersonal connotation,
and in fact does have this Impersonal meaning for a great
many philosophers. The question then arises M to its nature
and what relationship human consciousness has to that con-
sciousness whloh seeks ende and achieves purposes lr the
absence of apparent intelligence?
SOLUTIONS 0F7KRED
1. Both Augustine and Descartes were agreed that consciousness
is our chief rowans of attaining certitude. It is the supreme
certainty and although we may be inclined to think of mind
in more comprehensive terms, we are forced to begin with tht
fact of human consciousness. Both of these philosophers
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believed in the s-ul as a personal entity. Consciousness of
self (soul) was accepted, not as a probability but as our
only real certainty.
2. Bergson'e idea of consciousness is as an instrument of
action. It is not an entity but a vital responsiveness. "Life
is consciousness launched into matter". He sees consciousness
as an expression of an impersonal vital urge into wakefulness,
from the unknown to the knowji, from the quiescent to the
lively.
3. Hume would go no further in his search for the self than
the study of consciousness. Consciousness shows all too
dearly that there is no such entity, for consciousness Itself
is merely the awareness of certain perceptions. Consciousness
and perception are synonymous.
GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Consciousness accompanies intellect and yet it is pos-
sible for the intellect to wor* when active ewareness is not
present. By active awareness is meant the active cognisance
of one's surroundings. The mind is at work a large part of
the time in the absence of such awareness. It is however,
this conscious "awareness" which is, above all else, the
38. Henri Berg son, Creative Evolution , London: Kacmillan
& Co., 1919, r.T^r:
'
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subject of endless speculation.
Perhaps we express consciousness most pertinently when
we speak of self-consciousness. What is it to he oonseiou.s
of th- self? It is the capacity to indulge in introspection.
We are not compelled to direct our consciousness outside of
ourselves. We are not dependent upon some external object
to provide the locus of consciousness as we assume to be the
case in animal life. We have the capacity to contemplate
our own thoughts, analyse our thought processes and see our-
selves objectively. The ability to do this caused first
Augustine, and later Descartes, to state it as the one given
certitude of personal existence. It is true that Hume
dismisses any ideas we may cherish about the •self 1
,
but the
feeling or intuition of this inner unity as an entity is
strong and reassuring.
It is one of philosophy^ perennial problems to find
some grounds for the belief in the existence of other minds,
although it is generally accepted by common sense that other
minds are Just as real as are our own. In actual fact we
rarely think of self-consciousness as ooncerned primarily
with the self alone. Without being too analytical we take
for granted that the self is capable of a vicarious existence
in that it can enter Into a sympathetic relationship with the
consciousness of other minds. There are some excellent
psychological reasons for this ability of course but these do
not tend to invalidate the joint at issue. The point stressed
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is not why or for what reason we share the feelings and emo-
tions of others, hut the fact that we do it at all, and have
so little reason to Acuta! its validity. 3elf-consciousness
is in a measure hetero-consciousness.
It is on the basis of ooramon sense that we think of
•awareness' as being in a sense diffused. The sense of one-
ness with our fellow creatures would not be possible were it
not for this common mental background. Idealism has been
quick to recognize this fact and has constructed a philosophy
upon its possible Implications. It would be foolish however,
for us to assume that there is little else involved. Despite
this common backdrop of mental states and the metaphysical
merging of suoh mental states, there is that quality of vital
awareness which is also distinctly individual. How it arises
is a question open to conjecture and one answer is usually as
good as another.
Augustine answers simply that it is an act of God—
a
divine co-operating principle vouchsafed to man alone, making
him "..little lower than the angels". This is perhaps too
unsophisticated an answer to satisfy many philosophers.
3t. Thomas Aquinas was not disconcerted when he was
faced with the inability of the mind to answer its own ques-
tioning. When we have exhausted the possibilities of reason
to resolve our dilemmas then we must leap across the unknown
by faith. Perhaps both St. Thomas and Augustine, far from
forsaking the path of true philosophy have found the path to
wisdom.
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Conscious awareness is, one feels, more than the natural
result of a complex nervous structure. To assume that the
more complex a particular organism becomes the oloser it moves
towards self
-recognition as a living thing is an unwarranted
assumption in the absence of a teleological theology.
Self-consciousness is not however, the whole nature of
mind. Mind has considerably wider implications and not only
manifests itself in the rhenomena of intellect, imagination,
memory and so on, but even more remarkably in intuition.
Indeed the mind would be without its data were it not
for the relationships provided by the intuitive function.
Intuition is our link with reality and it la this same faculty
which provides the stuff of knowledge which now directs our
consideration of the soul.
THE MIND A3 SOUL
ISSUES INVOLVED
The general tendency among philosophers has been to refer
to the soul from a purely functional point of view. It Is a
convenient term for denoting all the various properties of
the living organism. The question arises however, as to what
ultimate value, if any, the soul possesses. Is the soul
separable or is it doomed to extinction when the organism dies?
The problem is important in that, If the soul has a value in
itself and Is of a separable nature, then we face the possibility
of its destiny being of far more importance than its present
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workings. If on the other hand It is inseparably bound up
with the body, then undoubtedly, its present functions are
of greatest importance In any study. The soul has come to
have certain theological meanings and to use the word in any
other context seems to be unwise and leads to misunderstanding.
That this is the case is one of the misfortunes of philosophy.
30LUTIQN3 OFFERED
As we have already observed the soul has been referred
to in many different contexts. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
St. Thomas, Descartes and the idealists all speak of the soul
and the problem resolves itself into one of definition.
1. To Plato, Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, the soul was
the self. It was immaterial and separable from the body. It
implied a continuum of memory, and while it could not be
narrowed down to either intellect or consciousness, it was
both of these things.
2. Aristotle and Descartes use the word because it con-
veniently expresses a variety of functions, no one of which
is capable of describing the full context of mind. The soul
however is that which actualizes the body or provides the
dynamic impulse. It is questionable if the soul can retain
its identify after the death of the body.
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GrSNERAL CONSIDERATION
Just as we are intuitively aware of the relationships
between objects in experience, so also are we sensitive to
the oneness of all mental phenomena. We do not attempt to
separate intellect and consciousness, nor do we think of
memory and imagination as other than the several expressions
of a unified mental life. We are cognizant of the subtle
connectedness of all these phases of activity within the stream
of consciousness.
Plato's belief in two distinct worlds is an emphasis upon
the prior place of the soul in the life of man. We apprehend
more than shape, colour, texture—we discern ideas by the
bringing together of all these things into an Intelligible
relationship. The idea which is prior to the object is of the
nature of pure reality. How are x^e able to bring about suoh
a synthesis? By reason of the fact that the soul is divine
and able to go beyond the sensible qualities of things to the
immaterial nature of the idea.
In a word, Plato was pointing out that it is the thinking
reasoning, understanding mind as a whole which makes life the
vital experience it is. Analyze mind ae we will, the sum of
its functioning is to make a body into a man, to turn a world
into an object of contemplation and wonder. This is not
brought about by any one partioular function but by the mind
at work as a whole. We are confident that man is unique in
his possession of these powers of comprehension which single
7^
him out from all sentient creatures. We may account for this
fact In several ways. We may for Instance account for It as
having evolved through natural laws to a supernatural status,
from the simple to the oomplex, or we may account for It "by
a single creative act of God. In the one case It Is fortuitous,
in the other It is determined. Whatever decision we oome to,
It must be made within the mind itself. It must be the out-
come of a psycho-physical process.
Let us consider this for a moment. We are oonscious of
ourselves as "being"
,
not Just as bodies, but somehow as inner
spectators looking out. We make the postulate that apart from
this body, the soul (or mind) "is". This is a logical belief
and the question "How do we know?" is Irrelevant. The
ontologioal antithesis would be that the soul "isn't" whioh
is beyond thought to conceive. It may be suggested that the
problem itself is a false one in that it is generated by
physloal impulses whose complexity and organization makes it
pos?ible to conjure false data. In other words the psychical
is a oondition of the physical.
But il It not possible that we are approaching the problem
from the wrong end? May not the body (indeed all matter) be
a mode of the paychioal? The soul contemplates the body. It
is not the body which contemplates the soul. If soul is an
appanage of body then also are thought, intuition and all
psycluoal powers. This is all the more difficult to believe
in that the present trend of scientific theory is to rob matter
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more and more of its solidity and even of its rational order
(Heisenberg 1 I principle of indeterminacy).
The philosophers of every age have tried to resolve this
problem of soul. Each has oaught a partial truth and each
has helped to elucidate the problem for others by demonstrating
the weakness or the indubitableness of many conceptions. No
one system of philosophy possesses all the truth and there Is
a need for an integration of those truths which serve to make
for an acceptable philosophy.
Whatever the views of philosophers, one fact emerges
v^ry clearly, the nature of mind and the nature of mind's
relation to matter is by no means determined. It is still
the greatest of all mysteries—the most sublime creation in
the universe.
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